Russia Media Sustainability Index (MSI)
April 7, 2013
About the MSI
IREX designed the MSI to measure the strength and viability of any country’s media sector. The MSI considers all the factors that contribute to a media system—the quality of journalism, effectiveness of management, the legal environment supporting freedom of the press, and more—to arrive at scores on a scale ranging between 0 and 4. These scores represent the strength of the media sector components and can be analyzed over time to chart progress (or regression) within a country. Additionally, countries or regions may be compared to one another. IREX currently conducts the MSI in 80 countries, and IREX currently conducts the MSI in 80 countries, and produced the first Europe & Eurasia MSI in 2001.
MSI Overview | Africa | Asia | Europe & Eurasia | Middle East & North Africa
Download the Complete Russia MSI Chapter (PDF): 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2006/7 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001
MSI Russia - 2013 Introduction
Overall Country Score: 1.54
Public protests against cases of fraud during parliamentary elections in December 2011 had a profound impact on the content of media coverage in 2012. While federal television channels completely ignored the opposition before the end of 2011, in 2012 they covered all major events organized by the opposition. Opposition leaders, who used to be persona non grata on national television, became regular newsmakers.
In March 2012, Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia after a four-year hiatus from the post. The events that followed polarized Russian society and media. They included the criminal prosecution of the modern art group Pussy Riot for staging a demonstration in one of Moscow’s main orthodox cathedrals, the return of a libel clause to the Criminal Code, a series of rapidly adopted new laws imposing heavier penalties for unauthorized public gatherings, tighter control over NGOs receiving foreign grants, a blacklist of websites deemed damaging for the health and development of minors, and a ban on adoption of Russian orphans by US citizens. In polls, Russians were divided on whether these moves were meant to preserve stability, stop the protests, or silence the opposition.
State-affiliated media were often used as instruments of pro-government and anti-opposition propaganda, such as the federal NTV channel’s “Anatomy of Protest” programs, which purported to prove foreign sponsorship and pay for opposition protestors. The TV Press Club, an informal community of journalists who cover television, called these and similar programs on the leading channel, Channel One, notable for their “propagandist zeal, use of disinformation, facts juggling, and promoting intolerance to dissent.”
At the same time, many journalists of the few independent media outlets brought their own objectivity under question by openly supporting and even organizing the opposition during 2012. Prominent journalists were laid off from major outlets throughout the year, which was widely regarded as an attempt by the state to assert control.
The overall MSI score for Russia, as well as the scores for all five objectives, fell this year. The majority of panelists felt that the overall situation in Russian media deteriorated.
One of the laws adopted in 2012 expanded the scope of treasonable offenses to include any citizen who provides information—not merely state secrets—to an international or foreign organization. This could be interpreted as state treason if Russian authorities determine that the information undermines national security, which is also vaguely defined. So to minimize the potential risk to their safety, participants in the Russia MSI study was made anonymous for the first time in 12 years. Interestingly, the moderator noted that newly-recruited MSI panelists were more eager to participate than ever. These indicators of Russia’s rapidly evolving media environment may be the most telling of all.
