Why Is Dagestan Moving Closer to Moscow?
Dr. Robert Bruce Ware
Associate Professor
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
Tel: 618- 650- 2913
Fax: 618- 650- 3509
Research Topic: Will current efforts to bend Dagestan's political institutions to fit a Russian federal mold have a destabilizing effect in the Caspian and Caucasus regions? Located strategically at Russia's southernmost tip, and accounting for much of its Caspian Sea coast, Dagestan is Russia's most heterogeneous republic. It's two million plus citizens are divided among thirty-four ethno-linguistic groups. Some of these groups, such as Avars, Azeris, Chechens, Lezgins, and Nogais, are themselves divided by contentious frontiers, and Dagestan's predominantly Muslim population has seen violence between Islamic traditionalists and Wahhabi fundamentalists.
Since the conflict in August and September of 1999 on its Western frontier, Dagestan has rapidly moved closer to Moscow. Budgetary transfers from Moscow to Mahachkala have increased six-fold, and Moscow has done much to promote and develop Mahachkala as a hub for hydrocarbon transfers from Caspian fields to Western markets. This trend stands in stark contrast with those of the transitional period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there was minimal central influence upon events in Dagestan. Indeed there were times in the earlier period when it seemed that the influence and authority of Azerbaijani leader, Geydar Aliev, was stronger than that of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
The political latitude of this period is reflected in the constitution that Dagestan adopted in 1994. While Dagestan's unique political institutions differ dramatically from those of any other Russian region, from those of the Federation as a whole, and indeed from those of any other part of the world, they have proven both effective and resilient in managing and avoiding ethnic conflicts.
Yet beginning with the economic sphere, central control over Dagestani structures has been rapidly increasing. Genuine federal principles are being replaced by centralized, sometimes authoritarian, means of control, illustrated by the seven new federal districts patterned upon the top-down organization of the Russian military. Like other regional elites, Dagestani officials remain uncertain of their position within this new federal structure. Yet while the full implications of this reorganization remain unclear the process has already had significant effects in Dagestan.
What effect will Russian recentralizing trends have upon regional stability in the Caspian? Will current efforts to bend Dagestani institutions to fit a federal mold have a destabilizing effect? The current Dagestani system is the result of a lengthy historical process of political evolution that has extended informally over centuries in response to constant power clashes and complex counter-balancing forces, none of which can be readily eliminated from the political scene. Since Moscow cannot hope to modify the localized internal pressures that have produced this system and that successfully have been channeled within it, will externally imposed modifications prove to be counterproductive?
This project treats the invasions of Dagestan in August and September of 1999 by Chechnya-based militants as watershed events in the relations of Mahachkala to Moscow. It hypothesizes that there are essentially three reasons for Dagestan's increasing closeness to Moscow. First, in contrast with other Caucasian republics, the Dagestani outlook is characterized by attitudes of pragmatism, toleration, moderation, and a multiethnic identity. These traditional attitudes led most Dagestanis to react strongly against pressures from political and religious extremists that sought to separate Dagestan from Moscow during the period from 1996 to 1999. Increasing closeness between Dagestan and Moscow is a result of that reaction. Second, the conflict of 1999 forced Moscow and Mahachkala to acknowledge their mutual dependence. In 1999, Dagestanis stood at the edge of a social and economic abyss, and many recognized that without military and economic assistance from Moscow Dagestan might soon resemble Chechnya or Afghanistan. At the same time, Moscow recognized that Dagestani propensities toward moderation were all that prevented a viable and militant Islamist state stretching from the shores of the Caspian to the outskirts of Vladikavkaz and reducing Moscow's access to Caspian resources. The result of this mutual recognition is the current state of economic, political, and military symbiosis between Moscow and Mahachkala. Third, the newly installed Prime Minister Putin gained stature from his response to the invasions of Dagestan, and gained affirmation for his view that the key to Russia's problems was not existing conditions of regional pluralism, but a closely coordinated central response.
Research Methods: The central component of this study, a formalized closed survey of 1001 respondents from across the Republic, involved the administration of a twenty-seven-item questionnaire. In accord with authoritative demographic data available in Natsional'nosti Dagestana, the sample was stratified, in the first phase of selection, with respect to ethnic groups, urbanites and villagers. Villagers were further stratified among categories of lowlands, foothills, and highlands. In the second phase of selection, individual respondents were selected from voter registration lists in the sites that were chosen in the first phase.
In order to provide a qualitative supplement to the quantitative survey data, the study involved 40 open-ended interviews with members of Dagestan's professional, scientific, and creative intelligentsia, together with an analysis of event data gathered continuously from 1997 to the present.
The study examines the recent alteration of Dagestan's political institutions and practices in response to federal pressures. It considers survey and interview data concerning Dagestani attitudes toward those institutions and practices, toward identification generally with Dagestan and with Russia, and toward federal capabilities for crisis resolution.
Research Findings: While Moscow's increased economic support has a stabilizing effect, its efforts to increase central control and to force Dagestan into the federal mold have altered institutions that have proven uniquely effective in stabilizing the Republic's complex ethnic relations. However, survey results show that Dagestanis are dissatisfied with the efficacy of their political institutions. Interviews suggest that these attitudes have much to do with perceptions of political corruption and mismanagement, along with an absence of economic opportunities. At the same time, Dagestanis identify strongly with Dagestan and with Russia, and show remarkable confidence in federal officials to resolve crises.
Thus many Dagestanis may welcome increasing central control in so far as it is sufficiently comprehensive and consistent to stimulate economic development, reduce corruption, and institute the rule of law. In the absence of such improvements, an unceremonious, arbitrary, or partial alteration of political structures, including a cancellation of ethnic electoral districts or the forced implementation of a presidential system, will have at least a potentially destabilizing effect.
Whatever the merits of Russian centralization, the heterogeneity of Dagestani society mandates a measure of autonomy. So far, Dagestani officials have displayed remarkable ingenuity, and federal officials have shown a modicum of flexibility, in the achievement of this result.
All of this points to a new role for Dagestan as the right arm of Moscow's Caspian policy. Moscow will work with Dagestani leaders to build closer ties to Azerbaijan, and other Muslim societies in the region. Increasingly, it will attempt to promote Mahachkala as a depot for the transfer of regional hydrocarbons. However, there are still no signs that either Moscow or Mahachkala will be able to control caviar poaching along Dagestani shores. The reduction of caviar poaching will require and increase in economic development and a decrease in corruption, both of which will require judicious assistance from Moscow.
Future Research: The survey found complex patterns social and political alienation among Dagestan's indigenous Lezgins and Chechen-Akhins. Both groups present long-term challenges, in part because their populations span internal and international frontiers. Further study of these groups would be helpful. It would also be helpful to study attitudes on the part of the Russian leadership and public toward the people of the Caspian and Caucasus regions.
Recommendations: While Moscow has chronically failed to understand Dagestani society, it is showing signs of increased sensitivity to the economic and political needs of the Republic, and is thereby strengthening its presence in the region. As it prepares for growing involvement around the Caspian, the United States would be well-advised to adopt a similar strategy.
In Dagestan, and perhaps elsewhere in the region, American motives are now objects of considerable misunderstanding, and of greater suspicion than are those of Moscow. If misperceptions are not corrected, increased American engagement could prove precipitous.
Whether combating terrorism or competing for resources, the US must devote attention to the complex attitudes and needs of local people. An American presence inevitably will set off sparks, and few of America's policy objectives will be achieved if portions of this volatile region go up in flames. On the other hand, frictions can be reduced by shifting the emphasis from geopolitical competition to regional cooperation that never loses sight of the need for local development.