Coping Without Communism: Private Services and State-building in the Caspian Region
Kelly McMann
Postdoctoral Researcher
Davis Center, Harvard University
Introduction
With the dismantling of communism in the former Soviet bloc, state services have dwindled, forcing residents of these countries to cope with everyday problems that were once resolved by their governments. The Soviet government provided broad, low quality social assistance, but, in the post-Soviet era, market reforms and economic crises have eroded the state welfare systems. This study examines how citizens' strategies for coping with everyday problems that the government no longer resolves affect state capacity and legitimacy. For example, citizens who feel that the state is not providing adequate services may refuse to pay their taxes, thus limiting funds for government programs and undermining state capacity. If disgruntled citizens turn to non-state actors for assistance, they may eventually transfer their loyalty to those who can meet their needs. And, if these alternative service-providers have a radical political agenda, this empowerment poses a direct challenge to the state. To the extent that citizens find non-state service-providers superior to government institutions these coping behaviors can also challenge state legitimacy.
These issues are particularly salient in the Caspian Sea Region, where declining social welfare and ineffective governance ignited battles in 1999, 2000, and 2001 between government troops and supporters of the multinational Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-an organization designated by U.S. President George W. Bush as part of the global terrorist network. Throughout the region Islamic traditions have predisposed some of the movement's supporters to see an Islamic state as a solution to their everyday problems, and the proximity of Afghanistan has enabled them to rely on arms and drug trafficking and a wider fundamentalist Islamic network as means of coping. By exploring the connections between coping behaviors and state-building in the Caspian Sea region, this project will evaluate the extent to which Caspian Sea countries may serve as a breeding ground for global terrorism. Moreover, the project will suggest how economic development, specifically the improved provision of services, can promote security in the Caspian Sea region and worldwide.
I. Research Methods
To achieve these objectives, this project combines fieldwork and mass survey research in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In the summer of 2002, I conducted 101 interviews with members of Russian and Kazakh households, government officials, and nongovernmental service providers, such as mullahs, in Kazakhstan-in the northern industrial city of Karaganda and its satellite towns and in a village in the southern agricultural province of Zhambyl. I also interviewed government officials, nongovernmental service-providers, and welfare specialists and collected socioeconomic data in Astana and Almaty and in the provincial capital of Zhambyl. In 1997 and 1998 I conducted 131 interviews with similar people in Kyrgyzstan. I am now using the interview data to design the survey questionnaire, which will be administered in 2002 in collaboration with Dr. Pauline Jones Luong of Yale University. I am also analyzing the data in order to refine the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis A: Experiences coping with problems no longer resolved by the state are more likely to reduce state legitimacy when the general economic trends in a country are negative.
In the course of my fieldwork, I found that citizens are more likely to blame difficult coping experiences on their government when a country's general economic trends are negative. The lower the overall economic growth in a country and the greater the delays in wage and pension payments, the more likely citizens are to conclude that the government is neither able nor willing to resolve their everyday problems. The interaction among coping experiences, general economic trends, and legitimacy is evident by comparing the views of unemployed people I interviewed in Kazakhstan and in Kyrgyzstan, none of whom was personally receiving unemployment benefits. In Kazakhstan, where wages and pensions are now generally paid on time, I found that unemployed people did not blame the government for their difficulties finding a job. They expressed the belief that it was their own responsibility to find employment. By contrast, in Kyrgyzstan, where wages and pensions often go unpaid, unemployed people tended to fault the government when they could not find a job. I expect to find a similar relationship in Uzbekistan, where the economy has also stagnated.
Hypothesis B: Experiences coping with problems no longer resolved by the state are more likely to reduce state legitimacy among citizens who are not members of the titular ethnic group.
The challenge of dealing with everyday problems that the Soviet state once addressed but the newly independent governments have failed to resolve is likely to increase ethnic minorities' skepticism about the new regime. Because of greater difficulties in finding employment-one of the most common unresolved problems-ethnic minorities are more likely than the titular groups to see the former Soviet system or a more multiethnic form of government as a better alternative to the current regimes. Members of the titular group have an advantage in finding work because their kin dominates government and some private industries. Russians and Germans can continue to use their technical abilities as selling points; however, the decline in production has meant that technical posts have evaporated since the Soviet era. In sum, to the extent that ethnic minorities now personally struggle with problems once resolved by the Soviet state, they are likely to view the new governments as even less legitimate.
Hypothesis C: Coping behaviors that challenge the capacity of the state are more likely to be employed by non-titular ethnic groups.
Like state legitimacy, state capacity is influenced by the ethnic identity of citizens. A person who is an ethnic minority, or an "outsider" relative to the new titular governments, is more likely to choose a coping behavior that undermines state legitimacy and capacity. For example, Russians in Kazakhstan enlist the support of diaspora organizations-some of which have challenged the state by advocating that the boundaries between Kazakhstan and Russia be redrawn. By contrast, when Kazakhs turn to non-state actors for assistance, they are more likely to seek help from aksakals and lineage groups, which are enmeshed in the state structure. While each ethnic group may exhibit these different tendencies, my fieldwork to date indicates that most minorities, like titular groups, turn to family and friends and only small numbers seek the assistance of formal groups like diaspora organizations. The survey data about larger numbers of individuals will provide confirming or disconfirming evidence.
Hypothesis D: Coping behaviors that challenge state capacity are more likely to be used in rural areas.
Due to the relative ease of consuming agricultural goods, rural residents are more likely to rely on coping behaviors that weaken state capacity. In all three countries, people in agricultural regions can more easily use goods taken from state workplaces, like produce from state farms. Thus pilfering, which hinders state capacity, is likely to be a common coping behavior in agricultural regions. By contrast, residents of industrial regions have greater difficulty making use of materials from state factories and instead survive by creating service businesses in these densely populated areas. This difference between rural and urban regions presumes that the state plays the roles of owner and employer in a locale. In the village in Kazakhstan where I conducted interviews, the sovkhoz (state farm) employed only 11 people and had distributed most of its property, so few in the village even have the opportunity to pilfer from it.
Hypothesis E: Coping behaviors that challenge the capacity of the state are more likely to be employed in countries where democratization has been limited.
When freedom of organization and movement is not guaranteed, only clandestine service-providers, in opposition to the state, are likely to emerge. Evidence of this relationship exists in Uzbekistan where the IMU developed, not only as a result of Islamic belief in certain regions of the country, but also because of the government's policy of suppressing any political opposition. Administering the mass surveys in the three countries will enable me to evaluate this hypothesis because Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan exist on a spectrum, from less democratic to more democratic, respectively.
II. Preliminary Conclusions
While my recent fieldwork in Kazakhstan and prior research in Kyrgyzstan have enabled me to refine these hypotheses, it has also led me to the tentative conclusion that radical Islamic movements based on discontent with economic circumstances and state policy toward religion, such as the IMU, are not likely to take hold in Kazakhstan. In response to new economic problems, citizens of Kazakhstan have turned to nonviolent, secular forms of coping. In urban areas citizens tend to rely on old and new "formal" structures of support, such as university placement services that have evolved from the Soviet era and for-profit employment agencies that have appeared since the demise of communism. In rural areas people seek support from family and friends, as they did in the Soviet era, but also from those private farmers who have managed to create successful businesses in the post-Soviet period. Islamic institutions seem to play only a minor role in charity, competing with many other possible service-providers in urban areas and causing suspicion among citizens in both cities and villages. Even in villages, where people may respect Islamic leaders, they tend to be wary of contact with mosques. This is most likely because of the relative weakness of Islam in the pre-Soviet steppe, the atheistic propaganda during the Soviet era, and the fear of radical Islam. Moreover, village mosques and Islamic leaders are not necessarily rich in resources, hindering their ability to help people economically. Finally, coping behaviors, whether tied to Islam or not, are unlikely to be violent or "radical." Citizens of Kazakhstan explained that they have adapted to the new, reduced role of the state in society and expect little of the government. They tended to blame not the government, but rather the "times" or the "era" for their problems.
In contrast to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are likely to witness a continued growth in radical Islamic movements. My findings from the field highlight that people's coping behaviors are based on "coping opportunities," such as the availability of government employment centers or wealthy mosques and that people's attitudes and actions toward the government are informed by the general economic trends in the country. The influence of ethnicity, degree of urbanization, and level of democratization are mediated by these factors. In Uzbekistan more coping opportunities are tied to radical Islam, and in Kyrgyzstan a declining economic situation has led to disgust with the government. Thus, I expect that the risks of destructive coping behaviors and reduced state legitimacy and capacity are greater in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The mass survey throughout the three countries will be critical for testing these ideas.
III. Suggestions for Scholars and Policymakers
To discourage violent coping techniques and promote security in the Caspian Sea region and worldwide, I believe scholars should concentrate on questions more central to everyday life in this region and policymakers should focus on economic development. With the increasing ease of data collection and signs of marketization and democratization in the former East bloc, American and European social scientists tend to begin with Western concepts, such as "party-building," and explore them in a country, such as Kazakhstan, where the issues are simply not central. My experience suggests that some of the issues most important to the lives of Central Asians today are corruption, political protests, market creation, and relations between countries of the region-all of which are connected to economic development and security. My research in Central Asia, and in Russia, suggests that the most effective use of U.S. funds to the former Soviet Union is for microcredit programs. Although these programs do not affect large numbers of people, they do provide income for some families and offer economic independence from local authorities, which is important for the development of democracy. Moreover, participants in the program acquire an increased sense of responsibility for their lives and a feeling of greater confidence. While the programs should perhaps be adapted to increase collaboration with government officials, who can help create markets and favorable legal regimes, microcredit is a clear benefit of foreign involvement in the region.